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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Judicial Watch, Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) is a not-for-profit, public interest 
organization that has no parent company and no publically-held corporation has a 
10% or greater ownership interest in Judicial Watch. 
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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,  
RULING, AND RELATED CASES 
 
Parties, Intervenors and Amici:   
 The Parties, Intervenors and Amici appearing in the lower court and in this 
appeal are listed in the Brief for the Appellant. 
 
Ruling Under Review: 
 The ruling under review in this appeal is the February 22, 2011 Order of The 
Honorable Gladys Kessler.  The Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order 
is reported at Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
 
Related Cases: 
 There are no other associated cases in this judicial circuit.  There exist, 
however, numerous cases in other judicial circuits regarding the present issues here.  
Four of those cases have issued substantive rulings on the issue presented here, 
which include Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-2388 (6
th
 Cir. Oct. 22, 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal filed, 
No. 10-2347 (4
th
 Cir. Dec. 1, 2010); Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), appeal filed, No. 11-1057 (4
th
 Cir. Jan. 18, 
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2011); and State of Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep=t of Health and 
Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011), appeal filed, No. 
11-11021 (11
th
 Cir. Mar. 8, 2011). 
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GLOSSARY 
 
AAA   Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
 
CCPA  Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 
 
CRA   Civil Rights Act of 1964  
 
CSA   Controlled Substances Act of 1970 
 
PPACA  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
 
SMCRA  Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
 Founded in 1994, Judicial Watch is a non-profit, non-partisan, public interest 
organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. that seeks to promote 
accountability, transparency and integrity in government and fidelity to the rule of 
law.  In furtherance of these goals, Judicial Watch regularly monitors on-going 
litigation, files amicus curiae briefs, and prosecutes lawsuits on matters that it 
believes are of public importance.  The case at issue raises important questions of 
constitutional interpretation and the proper balance of power between the several 
states and the federal government.  Specifically, Judicial Watch has undertaken 
extensive research on whether an individual who simply does not purchase health 
insurance has performed an activity that Congress may properly regulate under its 
commerce power.  Because it believes that this question alone resolves the matter 
before this Court, it is necessary for Judicial Watch to file its brief separately from 
other participating amici curiae.   
 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  
Furthermore, no person other than Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel 
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1309420      Filed: 05/23/2011      Page 11 of 28
  
 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Under the Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress may 
regulate activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.  
Fundamentally at issue before this Court is whether Section 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act regulates an activity.  Based on a review of 
United States Supreme Court precedent as well as the plain meaning of the term 
“activity”, Congress exceeded its authority by regulating an individual who simply 
does not purchase health insurance. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. Introduction 
 On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as 
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (hereafter “PPACA”).  Before day‟s end, lawsuits 
were filed in federal courts all across the United States challenging the 
constitutionality of the PPACA.  By current count, more than 20 lawsuits have been 
filed by individuals, organizations and the Attorneys General or Governors of 26 
states.  Chief among the offending provisions is ' 1501, entitled “Requirement to 
Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage.”  See PPACA § 1501 (adding 26 U.S.C. § 
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 3 
5000A) (hereafter “individual mandate”).   
 Section 1501 requires individuals, with certain limited exceptions, “for each 
month beginning after 2013 [to] ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential 
coverage for such month.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).  The law requires that 
individuals report on their federal individual income tax returns the months of the 
year in which they had such coverage.  If an individual fails to obtain such 
minimum essential coverage, he or she must include with their annual federal tax 
payment a “shared responsibility payment,” which is a fixed dollar amount penalty 
calculated under the PPACA.  Id. at §§ 5000A(b), (c). 
 The various plaintiffs, including Appellants, argue that the individual 
mandate and penalty exceed Congress= authority under the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.  Currently, two United 
States District Courts have declared that the provision is unconstitutional as ultra 
vires of Congress‟ Commerce Clause power.1  Three other United States District 
                                                 
1
 See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. 
Va. 2010), appeal filed, No. 11-1057 (4
th
 Cir. Jan. 18, 2011) and State of Florida ex 
rel. Bondi v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011), appeal filed, No. 11-11021 (11
th
 Cir. Mar. 8, 2011). 
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Courts, including the District Court below, have found the opposite.
2
   
 The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”  U.S. Const. art I, ' 8, cl. 3.  Relevant here is what is commonly 
referred to as the “Interstate Commerce Clause” portion of this grant of power: “To 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”  The exact meaning of this 
clause has sparked wide debate and many different court interpretations within 
different federal circuits and the United States Supreme Court.  The High Court has 
addressed this issue many times since the days of Chief Justice Marshall and many 
times it has expanded and contracted the meaning of this clause.   
 Distilling its earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence into a workable rule of 
law, the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) explained that 
Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activity under its commerce 
power: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” and (3) 
                                                 
2
 See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 
2010), appeal filed, No. 10-2388 (6
th
 Cir. Oct. 22, 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal filed, 
No. 10-2347 (4
th
 Cir. Dec. 1, 2010); and Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1309420      Filed: 05/23/2011      Page 14 of 28
  
 5 
“those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” (citations omitted); see also 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-277 (1981); and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-609 (2000).  It is this third category that Appellees 
argue grants them the authority to require individuals to purchase health insurance or 
else pay a penalty.  The question, thus, presented for this Court=s determination, is 
whether an individual who does not purchase health insurance has performed an 
activity.   Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.  Or, quite simply, is not purchasing health 
insurance an activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power?  A 
review of United States Supreme Court precedent where statutes regulating 
“activity” were held to be constitutional demonstrates that the answer is no. 
II. The Supreme Court=s Definition of AActivity@ 
 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Filburn, a farmer who actively 
engaged in the over-cultivation of wheat, was assessed a penalty for growing more 
than his allotted amount of wheat under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
(hereafter “AAA”) (7 U.S.C. § 1281, et seq.).  Filburn brought suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the AAA were 
unconstitutional because, as he argued, Congress did not have the power to regulate 
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his excess wheat production that he used for home consumption and not for sale.  
Yet the Court found that, although Filburn‟s wheat consumption alone would only 
have a minimal impact on the market, when combined with others similarly situated, 
the impact would be substantial on interstate commerce.  Id. at 127-28.  As a 
result, the Court upheld the AAA as a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ 
commerce power.  Most courts and commentators agree that the holding in 
Wickard is the Court‟s most expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (Wickard is “perhaps the most far reaching example 
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”).  It therefore can be seen 
as the outermost reach of the Commerce Clause.
 In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), a corporate 
businessman who actively engaged in the discriminatory operation of a motel 
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (hereafter “CRA”) (42 U.S.C § 2000a, et seq.) exceeded Congress‟ 
powers under the Commerce Clause.  The Court examined Title II and its 
legislative history and determined that it was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ 
commerce power because it was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and 
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people.”  379 U.S. at 250, 
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257.  Such enterprises that had an effect on interstate commerce were the 
discriminatory operations of hotels and motels.  The Court concluded that the 
prohibitory provisions of Title II could constitutionally be applied to the hotel 
proprietor=s discriminatory activities because the undisputed facts revealed that he 
solicited and received patronage from interstate travelers.  Id. at 243, 249-50.  His 
actions of discriminatorily operating the hotels and motels were the aim of the CRA. 
 Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), several 
businesspersons who actively engaged in the discriminatory operation of a 
restaurant brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation under Title II of the CRA 
exceeded Congress‟ powers under the Commerce Clause.  Once again, the Court 
held that Title II was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ commerce power 
because its application was limited to only a restaurant that “serves or offers to serve 
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . has moved 
in commerce.”  Id. at 298, 304.  The activity therefore in this instance was the 
discriminatory operation of restaurants.  In sum, the prohibitory provisions of Title 
II could constitutionally be applied to the restaurant proprietors‟ discriminatory 
activities because the undisputed facts revealed that they purchased a substantial 
portion of their food and inventory from sources engaged in interstate commerce.  
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Id. at 296-97, 304.  The restaurant proprietors, in other words, were active 
participants in interstate commerce as purchasers.
 In Perez, 402 U.S. 146, Perez, an individual who actively engaged in 
loan-sharking, sought review of his conviction under Title II of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act of 1968 (hereafter “CCPA”) (18 U.S.C. § 891, et seq.).  Perez argued 
that Congress lacked the authority to enact the provision under its commerce power 
because his alleged activities were entirely intrastate.  The Court however held that 
it was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ commerce power because Perez‟s 
activity of extortionate credit transactions, although purely intrastate, directly 
affected interstate and foreign commerce as a component of organized crime, an 
interstate enterprise.  402 U.S. at 154, 156.  The Court, thus, upheld the petitioner=s 
conviction as he was “clearly a member of the class which engages in „extortionate 
credit transactions.‟”  Id. at 153. 
 In Hodel, 452 U.S. 264, several businesses, associations, and individuals who 
were actively engaged in surface coal mining operations filed suit seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (hereafter “SMCRA”) (30 U.S.C. ' 1201, et 
seq.).  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Congress lacked the authority to enact 
provisions of the SMCRA that regulated the use of private lands within the borders 
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of the specific states.  After examining the SMCRA and its legislative history, the 
Court held that the SMCRA was a constitutional exercise of Congress= commerce 
power because surface coal mining directly affects interstate commerce.  452 U.S. 
at 280-81.  Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiffs‟= argument that coal 
mining is a purely local activity with no effect on interstate commerce since coal, as 
a commodity, moves in interstate commerce and the Court has long held that it was 
within Congress= power to regulate the conditions under which goods shipped in 
interstate commerce are produced.  Id. at 281. 
 Finally, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005), two individuals who 
actively cultivated and used physician-recommended marijuana brought suit seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 (hereafter “CSA”) (U.S.C. § 801, et seq.) to the extent that it 
prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana for their 
personal medical use.  The plaintiffs argued that Congress was without power 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate their conduct as the marijuana they 
cultivated, possessed, and used was entirely produced and consumed locally.  
Looking to precedent, the Court disagreed: “Wickard thus establishes that Congress 
can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” in that it is not 
produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would 
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undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”  545 U.S. at 18.  
The Court therefore held that the CSA was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ 
commerce power because the activity that was sought to be regulated B possessing, 
obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana B directly affects interstate commerce.  Id. at 
18-20. 
III. There Exists No “Activity” Subject to the Commerce Clause in This Case. 
 
 The above cases clearly demonstrate that the Supreme Court requires 
something more than mere passivity for Congress to exercise its commerce power.  
Said another way, the Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires 
that Congress regulate an activity, as opposed to not engaging in an activity.  In 
Wickard, the plaintiff grew wheat; in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the plaintiff operated a 
hotel; in McClung, the plaintiffs operated a restaurant; in Perez, the plaintiff 
engaged in loan-sharking; in Hodel, the plaintiffs engaged in surface coal mining; 
and in Raich, the plaintiffs cultivated, possessed, and used marijuana.  Indeed, in 
each of these instances and in every Supreme Court case decided thus far under the 
third category delineated in Lopez, the legislation regulated some form of activity.
3
 
                                                 
3
 In addition to the aforementioned cases, see also, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. 
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (prevented coal manufacturing and 
production); Int=l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934) 
(conspired to prevent the delivery of live poultry through violence and intimidation); 
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 In this case, the District Court found that an individual who does not purchase 
health insurance performs an activity and, thus, may be regulated by Congress under 
the Commerce Clause.  Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55, 56.  Yet, the 
District Court‟s position that an individual who does not purchase health insurance 
performs an activity is contradicted by the common meaning of “activity.”  The 
verb to be “active,” the root word of “activity,” is defined by Merriam-Webster=s 
Dictionary of Law as “characterized or accomplished by action or effort.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (traded futures in grain); Houston, E. & 
W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (established railroad carrier 
rates); Railroad Com. of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) 
(established railroad carrier rates); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933) 
(established railroad carrier rates); Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1 (1934) 
(established railroad carrier rates); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 
(1911) (operated a railroad); Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 
221 U.S. 612 (1911) (operated a railroad); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (manufactured iron and steel); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 
(1939) (operated a factory that processed garments); Northern Sec. Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (consolidated stock, property and franchise of 
competitor insolvent railroad); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) 
(bought, slaughtered, processed, and sold live stock); United States v. Patten, 226 
U.S. 525 (1913) (purchased cotton for future delivery); C. E. Stevens Co. v. Foster & 
Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255 (1940) (conspired to create a monopoly in the local bill 
posting business); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (state employer 
instituted pay raises); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) 
(produced and sold milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) 
(manufactured and shipped goods); A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 
(1942) (produced and stored goods for commerce); and Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (operated refineries who 
conspired to fix prices). 
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Merriam-Webster=s Dictionary of Law (1996).  Common sense alone compels the 
conclusion that an individual who does not purchase health insurance has not taken 
an action or exerted effort.  The individual does not even need to take a “mental 
action.”  The individual does not need to make a decision not to purchase health 
insurance; the individual simply will not purchase health insurance.  Since 
Congress has regulated this passivity, Congress has overstepped the Commerce 
Clause=s boundaries in attempting to regulate Appellants.  Indeed, it seems that 
Congress has put the cart before the horse.  In an effort to regulate Appellants, 
Congress is attempting to compel them into action through the PPACA. 
 The drafters of the Constitution anticipated power grabs similar to the power 
grab accomplished by Congress when it passed the PPACA.  Therefore, the drafters 
established “a Federal Government of limited powers.‟”  New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 
(1991)).  In this regard, James Madison, the father of the Constitution, once wrote: 
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined.  Those which 
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.  . . .  The powers reserved to the several States 
will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course 
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State. 
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The Federalist No. 45, pp 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  Said more plainly, 
Congress must only exercise those powers expressly granted to it and no more.  In 
this case, Congress has clearly overstepped the boundaries established by law. 
A worthwhile analogy to consider is the concept of personal jurisdiction.  Courts in 
a state can exercise jurisdiction over a party located outside the state only so long as 
the party has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the State seeking to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  Int=l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  When an 
individual has no “minimum contacts” with a forum State, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits that State from acting against that 
individual.  Id.  Personal jurisdiction cannot be created by the unilateral activity of 
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident.  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  “The application of that rule will vary with the nature and 
quality of the defendant=s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its 
laws.”  Id. 
 Likewise, the Commerce Clause requires that at a minimum there be some 
economic act by which an individual purposefully subjects himself or herself  to 
regulation.  As demonstrated, the Commerce Clause requires something more than 
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mere existing as a living, breathing human being.  Nor is Congress‟ unilateral 
legislative act sufficient to grant it power over an individual who has not engaged in 
any activity.  As stated before, Congress has put the cart before the horse.  Under 
the guise of its Commerce Clause authority, Congress is requiring individuals to 
purchase health insurance at government approved prices and quantities.
 Recognizing the weak underpinnings of its conclusion that those who do 
nothing are engaging in “activity,” the District Court attempted to bolster its 
argument by reasoning that Congress may regulate all individuals today because 
someday in the future everyone will actively seek medical treatment, which will 
have an effect on interstate commerce.  Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at 
*56-61.  More specifically, the District Court reasoned that: (1) everyone will get 
sick, (2) and seek out medical treatment, (3) and possibly require an extended stay in 
a health care facility (4) that they cannot afford (5) for which family members or 
other charitable organizations will not cover, (6) and health care providers will have 
to cover, (7) which will result in higher health care costs for everyone.  Id.  Despite 
the obvious factual problems with this argument, i.e., some of the plaintiffs have 
sworn under oath that they will never seek medical treatment as it is adverse to their 
faith and/or nontraditional, homeopathic methods, the Supreme Court rejected in 
Lopez the argument that Congress may regulate activity based solely on the effect 
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that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences.  514 
U.S. at 563-567 (Court rejected as too attenuated the Government=s argument that 
firearm possession in school zones could result in violent crime which in turn could 
adversely affect the national economy.).  The Court called it “pil[ing] inference 
upon inference.”  Id. at 567.  The Court proclaimed that the Constitution does not 
tolerate reasoning that would “convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”  Id.  “[I]f we 
were to accept [such] arguments,” the Court reasoned, “we are hard pressed to posit 
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”  Id. at 
564; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (Court again rejected government‟s 
remote chain of inferences to declare unconstitutional as exceeding Congress‟ 
commerce power § 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Judicial Watch respectfully advocates that the 
Court reverse the lower court‟s ruling and hold that The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010), is unconstitutional. 
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